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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, the possibilities of tourism as a strategy 
for economic and social development in Peru are presented.  
Through the examination of previous governments, beginning 
with the Belaunde administration in 1963, the obstacles that 
Peru has faced in route to development are identified.  
Identification of the predominant issues at hand, 
unemployment, poverty and inequality, allows for further 
analysis of the policies implemented to stabilize the economy 
as well as provide immediate solutions for the above 
mentioned points of concern.  It becomes clear that while the 
country is rich in resources, beyond natural resources such 
as crude oil and minerals, the promotion and enhancement of 
the tourism industry has rarely been used as a means of 
earning revenue.  While there are a number of options to 
consider with regard to developmental strategies, the tourism 
industry presents definite opportunities for growth.  These 
benefits are closely examined in this thesis, demonstrating 
how much Peru has to offer, not only to tourists who seek to 
broaden their cultural knowledge but most importantly to the 
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1 
I. PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Sitting on a bus, packed with people leaving the city 
to return to their very modest homes which outlined one of 
the few major roads that would lead us to Pisco, I looked 
around me as if seeing things that I’ve known all my life 
for the very first time.  Not two miles outside of Lima did 
things not only change, but they changed drastically.  High 
rise buildings, upscale hotels, and very chic restaurants 
turned into small hut-like boxes, sporadic bodegas, and 
weathered faces that told stories of struggle, 
disappointment, neglect and most importantly the greatest 
desire to do whatever it takes to survive.  So my question 
was, and still is, why such disparity between what seem to 
be two completely different worlds separated by only a few 
miles?  Are these people content with their quality of 
life, despite knowing that change is not impossible?   
Extreme levels of poverty and inequality are nothing 
new in Latin America, and particularly in Peru.  They are 
unfortunate aspects of the historical heritage of the 
country’s society that have remained relatively unchanged.  
The divisions created between dominant minorities of 
European descent and majorities of indigenous and mixed 
descent continue to exist, resulting in profound inequality 
in social participation as well as in income.1  Rural 
majorities have for the most part been left out, disdained, 
or actively repressed by national leaders.  This is 
demonstrated through the failure of the state to 
incorporate this sector of society in the process of 
                     1 John Sheahan, Searching for a Better Society: The Peruvian Economy 
from 1950 (Pennsylvania State University, 1999), 4. 
2 
development by denying them access to human capital- 
education, skills and economic mobility.2  With this alone 
it is clear to see how development and economic 
transformation can be difficult to attain. 
Economic and social transformations in a developing 
country can prove to be challenging, but not impossible, 
especially if the country has valuable natural resources.  
This is the case for Peru.  Not only does the country hold 
a wealth of minerals, but it also possesses a plethora of 
beaches, jungles, and intriguing folklore.  Unfortunately, 
amidst rampant corruption, devastating violence, and 
economic crises, the country has seemingly been unable to 
taper the infrastructural problems that the population has 
been suffering from let alone raise their heads high enough 
to look around them to notice that the answer to much their 
economic and social problems lay before them at arms reach, 
through the promotion and expansion of the country’s 
tourism industry.   
Focusing on tourism provides an avenue for Peru to 
address one of the key flaws in its current development 
strategy: generating mass employment.  As this thesis will 
suggest, even when Peru has been able to sustain 
significant rates of economic growth, as occurred during 
the Fujimori and Toledo administration, this growth has not 
generated substantial increases in employment, further 
skewing the distribution of wealth in the country towards 
the rich.  As a service sector industry, tourism is a 
relatively labor intensive industry compared to mining and 
manufacturing.  It is also an industry in which Peru may 
have a strong comparative advantage due to the relative 
                     2 Sheahan, 4.  
3 
abundance of natural beauty and rich history.  In addition, 
it is likely to generate additional employment in those 
rural areas of the country where economic development has 
lagged.  The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the 
need for the tourism industry to become a centerpiece of 
the economic strategy of Peru.  This thesis first examines 
the traditional obstacles to successful development in Peru 
in Chapter I.  Chapter II demonstrates that these problems 
have not gone unnoticed, analyzing the efforts that have 
been made, whether partially successful or utter failures, 
by numerous administrations, beginning with Belaunde in 
1963.  Chapter III will focus on the Fujimori 
administration.  An entire chapter is dedicated to this 
particular regime as it demonstrates just how fruitful Peru 
can be if the appropriate measures are taken and policy 
implemented.  With the initial success of the government in 
delivering a remedy to counter inflation, violence, and to 
a degree, unemployment, it would have seemed that the 
future was optimistic for Peru and its people.  
Unfortunately, just as it did in the administrations 
preceding Fujimori, self-interest took over what was of 
greatest importance, the best interest of the country, and 
the government took a very dramatic downfall.  Finally, 
Chapter IV thoroughly explores the tourism industry; 
examining the positive and negative effects of an enhanced 
tourism sector; the regional inequalities of the tourism 
industry; and ultimately what has been done to promote the 
industry in an effort to build a sustainable source of 
revenue.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The lack of both economic and social development in 
the country, outside of cities such as Lima, is a direct 
4 
reflection of governmental policy as well as its overall 
concern for the wellbeing of society.  Between 1950 and 
present day, various reform policies have been implemented 
with promises of positive change that will in due course 
reduce both high levels of poverty and inequality.  It is 
not that there have been no attempts to attack these 
problems, but rather it is the manner in which these 
attempts have been implemented and have sub sequentially 
taken form, that has hindered the ability for long lasting 
positive effects.   
Through the analysis of individual governments and the 
economic policy orientation each took, beginning with 
Fernando Belaunde in 1963, there are various issues that 
stand out making the country’s failure to develop 
understandable.  Table 1 summarizes the main changes in 
government and policy orientation from 1963.3  In 
conjunction with problems regarding policy implementation, 
is the inconsistency of policy regarding foreign investment 
and state intervention, both of which will be examined more 
closely below.  Macroeconomic imbalance, abusive external 
borrowing which in turn leads to mounting deficit, a 
growing informal sector, and escalating violence add to the 
list of obstacles stagnating the development process in 







                      3 Table 1 exerted from “Searching for a Better Society: The Peruvian 
Economy from 1950” by John Sheahan.  Dates beginning from 1963 vice 
1950 as depicted in the book for the purpose of covering those years 
examined in this thesis.   
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Table 1.   Summary of changes in governments and economic 
policy orientation, 1963-1998 
 
Year Governments Economic Policy 
Orientation 





investment and; political 
impasse over proposed land 
reform and foreign 
domination of the oil 
industry. 
1968-1975 Radical reformist military 
(General Juan Velasco)  
Greatly increased state 
intervention and 
protection; 
nationalizations and state 
firms; thorough land 
reform, rising fiscal 
deficit and heavy foreign 
borrowing. 
1975-1980 Much more conservative 
military government (General 
Francisco Bermudez) 
Partial reversal of 
Velasco reforms though 
continued extensive public 
ownership and high 
protection. 
1980-1985 Democracy restored with 
Belaunde back, now more 
conservative and weakened by 
rise of Sendero Luminoso 
Initial “neoliberal” 
changes; somewhat reduced 
protection but continued 
high public investment; 
excess spending and forced 
contraction. 
1985-1990 All-out populism (Alan 
Garcia) 
Intervention in all 
directions at once; 
heterodox program to 
promote expansion while 
blocking inflation by 
direct controls; intense 
conflict with private 
sector over attempted 
nationalization of 
financial system. 
1990-2001 Neoliberal reforms combined 
with strand of 
authoritarianism (Alberto 
Fujimori)  
Thorough reversal of 
state-led intervention; 
protection greatly 
reduced, and foreign 
investors welcomed back; 
extensive privatizations. 
 
B. INCONSISTENT POLICY FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Foreign investment can take multiple forms and can 
affect development in a variety of manners depending on how 
the multinational firms investments are implemented into 
6 
policy.  On one the one hand for example, there are those 
multinational firms who seek to cater to the higher income 
urban population. This firm is “rarely interested in 
exporting, and not primarily concerned with utilizing the 
country’s own factors of production”.4  On the other hand, 
there are those who seek investment in order to take 
advantage of the low labor costs available to them as well 
as to earn foreign exchange.  This second group is the one 
to take advantage of being that their search for cheap 
labor will aid in the reduction of unemployment and provide 
some sort of income to individuals who would otherwise have 
none.  Unfortunately, Peru fell into the hands of the first 
all too eagerly and consequentially losing control of what 
should belong to the host country.  “Foreign investment had 
become very important early in the twentieth century in 
mineral extraction, then gradually spread into domestic 
industry as well.  An estimate of its extent is that firms 
under foreign control owned 46 percent of the fixed assets 
of all large manufacturing businesses by 1969.”5   
The fear of a takeover by these firms is 
understandable and is reflected in those policies 
implemented by governments that have chosen to close the 
doors to foreign investors completely, such as the Velasco 
government.  While it is a very effective means of 
providing protection to state industries, it has more of a 
negative overall effect than positive.  Shutting one door 
shuts many others, including one that leads to an increase 
in production capability and efficiency. Foreign investment 
                     4 John Sheahan, Patterns of Development in Latin America: Poverty, 
Repression, and Economic Strategy. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), 164. 
5 John Sheahan, Searching for a Better Society: The Peruvian Economy 
from 1950. (Pennsylvania State University, 1999), 87. 
7 
allows for contact and competition with the outside world, 
which in turn creates the pressures necessary for 
technological progress and the improvement of productivity.  
With Peru, as well as much of Latin America, already seen 
as being inferior in terms of technological advancement, 
this form of contact is much needed.    
Looking back at the policies implemented up to date, 
the constant back and forth efforts of Peruvian 
governments, in an attempt to find its way to development 
leave a strong possibility that investors will not want to 
invest in a country that cannot develop one consistent 
policy and make headway with it.  The first extreme change 
in policy began with the Velasco government’s strong turn 
against foreign investment.  Expropriations were 
implemented, the state purchased foreign owned firms, and 
evident hostility toward foreign investors put the downward 
spiral in motion.6  The first half of the 1980’s looked 
promising for investors, but hostility quickly returned 
upon the election of Alan Garcia.  With multinational firms 
essentially out of the picture and more than likely 
developing a questionable view of Peru as a country worth 
investing in, the Fujimori government re-opened the door to 
investment possibilities with open arms.  The incumbent 
president reassured investors of their decision by bringing 
down inflation not to mention reassurance that the issues 
of security were under control with the capture of Abimael 
Guzman, mastermind of the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso.  
Investment and industrial production rose strongly: from 
1990 to 1997, value added by manufacturing increased 5.4 
                     6 Sheahan, “Searching for a Better Society”, 87. 
8 
percent a year.7  While the end result was positive, there 
was never a long period of consistent policy regarding this 
issue.   
In light of the progress made in the 1990’s and 
despite the ultimate fall of Fujimori in 2000, it is 
evident that there are definite possibilities in making 
foreign investment successful for all parties involved.  
With the implementation of the right kinds of restraints 
and incentives there is hope for movement in the right 
direction.   
C. MISDIRECTED STATE INTERVENTION 
The inconsistency of policy directed at foreign 
investment is a prime example of the misdirected character 
of the country’s strategy of state-led development.  The 
active measures taken through intervention were not the 
issue, but rather the form they took.  “It made good sense 
to try to promote more modern and more dynamic industrial 
sectors, capable of innovation and continuing technical 
progress, but to shut out contact and competition with the 
outside world was a prescription going in the opposite 
direction.”8   
Looking beyond the benefits that can be derived 
through investment by multinational corporations, there are 
more basic matters that are requiring of the same, if not 
more, attention by the country’s government and need to be 
addressed.  First and foremost is the persistent failure of 
the state to provide equal access to education.  
Development cannot occur when a majority of the population 
is deprived of gaining the most basic skills needed to 
                     7 Ibid, 87. 
8 Sheahan, “Searching for a Better Society”, 188. 
9 
perform any job outside of the agricultural sector.  As it 
is, there is insufficient arable land to accommodate the 
labor force, leaving migration as the only answer to 
possible employment.  While urban jobs can be labor 
intensive and requiring minimal education, the negative 
aspect of technological advances shows itself in this 
regard.  Increasingly, jobs outside of agriculture require 
skills acquired through higher levels of vocational 
education. 
Second, is the issue concerning poverty levels and 
inequality, both of which result from the obvious lack of 
education and employment.  While figures annotated in a 
wide range of literature concerning Peru show increasing 
numbers in each sector, the subject matter was not ignored 
entirely. Efforts made to resolve these major setbacks took 
the form of a variety of social programs that “have been 
closely associated with the adoption of more market-
oriented economic strategies”.9  The programs developed 
intended to provide productive work rather than to provide 
traditional methods of support for the poor through 
measures that would interfere with the market by means of 
creation of subsidies or the increase of real wages.10  In 
the long run, the social programs were short lived and cast 
aside when other issues considered to be of greater 
importance arose, as was the case of the Garcia 
administration.  Two programs, the Programa de Apoyo 
Directo (PAD) and the Programa de Apoyo de Ingreso Temporal 
(PAIT) were initiated and quickly cast off upon indication 
that the government’s mismanagement of the economy had lead 
                     9 Sheahan, “Searching for a Better Society”, 124. 
10 Ibid, 124. 
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to accelerating inflation.  Not only were the programs 
abandoned, but also the Peruvian people who depended on it.  
Social spending decreased significantly and it hit an all 
time low of $21 per capita, including education, public 
health, welfare and all other social programs during the 
initial years of the Fujimori administration.11 It was not 
until the realization that elections were approaching in 
combination with pressures from international finance 
agencies that Fujimori stepped forward corruptly and 
intervened in an originally politically independent 
organization as a means of haggling votes from the rural 
poor.   
Protection and the use of social programs as 
instruments of the state-led development strategy fell 
short in many ways.  Protection essentially catered to the 
already high- income sector and social programs became a 
motivation of self-interest rather than genuine concern for 
the rural poor.   
D. MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCE & RISING EXTERNAL DEFICIT 
The second half of the 1970’s was a period in which 
external credit was too plentiful for Peru’s good, 
encouraging recourse to external borrowing to finance 
rising imports.  As mentioned, Peru has been relatively 
slow in its technological progress and instead of using the 
resources that foreign investment could have contributed to 
enhancing that aspect, many governments turned to the 
foreign lending opportunities available to them to bring in 
the imported capital equipment needed.  Of all the 
governments, the Velasco administration paved the way to 
serious macroeconomic imbalance and a rising external 
                     11 Sheahan, “Searching for a Better Society”, 125.  
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deficit that was a subsequent effect of the former. 
Imported equipment stimulated production by making it less 
labor intensive and more efficient however, that 
stimulation was not sufficient enough to bring production 
to the levels needed to earn adequate revenue from exports 
to pay off the debts incurred.  With debt increasing on one 
end, the method used by the central government to cover its 
growing fiscal debt was to continue borrowing from other 
financial agencies abroad, creating an outrageous balance 
of payments deficit.  The ease in which excess lending 
could be incurred was astounding, especially in Peru’s case 
which proved to be very unique.  With lending opportunities 
skyrocketing for a majority of Latin American countries 
despite their lack of ability to pay them off, the IMF 
developed what they thought would be a solution to the 
increasing balance of payments deficit.  The plan required 
that a seal of approval by the IMF be acquired prior to any 
lending be agreed to by multilateral agencies.  In 1977, 
during the Velasco administration, commercial banks agreed 
for the first time to refinance loans given to Peru without 
the seal of approval,12 thus making this plan ineffective in 
tapering off the deficit situation.  In the last three 
years of the Velasco government alone, the balance of 
payments deficit on current accounts rose from almost 
nothing to 10 percent GDP.13  Such dependence on imports and 
the abuse of foreign lending to attain them reflects the 
inadequate attention placed on balances between spending 
and productive capacity.   
                     12 Rosemary Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: An Economic 
History of Latin America in the 20th Century (New York: Inter-American 
Bank, 1998), 214. 
13 Sheahan, “Searching for a Better Society”, 138. 
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With governments that know no limits, how can 
development take a positive turn?  Pressure to pay off 
debts takes focus away from the problems that need the most 
attention; the reduction of poverty and inequality.   
E. GROWING INFORMAL SECTOR 
The informal sector in Peru encompasses a large number 
of the population.  Naturally, this is a result of the 
failure to provide adequate access to education and the 
excess of labor in comparison to the land available to the 
rural population as well as insufficient opportunities for 
productive employment.  Table 2 demonstrates the sectors 
growing importance as a considerable amount of Lima’s labor 
force is working in the informal sector.   
Peru’s informal sector does provide employment for 
many individuals, however this sector proves to be 
problematic in the sense that informals are not officially 
registered, giving them the opportunity to avoid any 
regulation, including taxes on their  earnings.  The only 
taxes paid are those placed on the products purchased from 
the formal sector.  Evasion of taxes however is not their 
primary motivation; rather it is their means of survival in 












Table 2.   Estimates of the percentages of workers in the 




Year Informal Workers 
as Percentages of 
the Labor force in 
Lima 
Household Workers 
as Percentages of 
the labor force in 
Lima˚ 
1970 31.6 9.8 
1986 -- -- 
1990 40.7 5.1 
1995 41.6 4.7 
1996 -- 4.2 
 
˚Informal workers defined as self-employed excluding professionals, 
unpaid family workers and both owners and employees in firms with less 
than five employees.  Domestic workers not included. 
 
A study by Hernando de Soto in his book, The Other 
Path, presents the obstacles faced by migrants when they do 
in fact try to gain real authorization to initiate 
productive activities.  He argues that the legal and 
institutional framework of the society included 
characteristics intended to protect existing privileges at 
the cost of development and entrepreneurship.15  While the 
informal sector is in part a response by the poor to the 
obstacles placed in their path by the government and 
privileged class, it is an added problem for a society that 
needs revenue from taxation.16   
During the later half of the 1980’s for example, Peru 
experienced perhaps the most traumatic episode in their 
economic history under the administration of Alan Garcia 
Perez.  The reformist program implemented was short lived, 
in particular the failed attempt to nationalize the 
                     14 Table 2 exerted from Searching for a Better Society: The Peruvian 
Economy from 1950 by John Sheahan. 
15 Hernando De Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the 
Third World (New York: Harper, 1985), 100. 
16 John Sheahan, Searching for a Better Society: The Peruvian Economy 
from 1950. (Pennsylvania State University, 1999), 101. 
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country’s banks.  As a result of the administration’s 
overall inability to “sustain a coherent policy coalition 
to support its reformist measures the formal economy 
declined and the informal economy expanded, depriving the 
state of crucial fiscal resources, particularly after the 
cutoff of international assistance by multilateral 
financial institutions in response to Garcia’s unilateral 
decision to reduce debt payments to 10 percent of export 
earnings”.17 In the end, the fiscal crisis grew 
continuously; further weakening the government’s already 
frail institutional, administrative, and coercive presence 
in society and adding fuel to the fire that guerilla 
violence in the more remote regions of the country thrived 
on. 
F. SOCIAL CONFLICT 
Violence in Peru was spurred by the country’s history 
of failure to do anything about the extreme poverty of the 
rural areas, discrimination against the indigenous 
population, and the government’s inability to generate 
adequate opportunity for productive employment.  Sendero 
Luminoso, the most lethal guerrilla group that formed in 
the highlands of Peru, was able to gain tremendous support 
from the rural population for this reason.  From the very 
beginning, attacks by Sendero were brushed aside as a 
problem for the highland region to deal with as though it 
were not a part of the country.  Eventually, various 
districts were placed under states of emergency and the 
problem was delegated to the military.  Human rights 
violations added yet another problem to the bag and became 
                     17 Jo-Marie Burt, “State Making against Democracy: The case of 
Fujimori’s Peru” in Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 251. 
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a point of major concern, not for the government of Peru 
but rather for international human rights agencies such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  Corruption 
and human rights abuses continued for the entirety of the 
Sendero Luminoso era, nearly 12 years, until the capture of 
Abimael Guzman in 1992.  While Sendero’s leader may be 
imprisoned, the group still remains and has continued to 
perform acts of terror to a lesser degree, making it 
evident that they have not disappeared completely.  If the 
most basic issues of poverty and inequality continue to 
remain in the backburner, it will only be a matter of time 
until the violence of the 1980’s reoccurs. 
With so many issues to tackle, the most obvious 
problems need to be taken care of first.  Through the 
examination of the different policy’s implemented 
throughout the years, it is apparent that the problems 
identified in this section stem from important structural 
conditions which work against equality and the reduction of 
poverty: pressure of rapid growth of the population and the 
rural force running against the limits of scarce land, 
inadequate opportunities for productive employment outside 
agriculture, and highly unequal access to education, 
skills, and health care.18  Once these issues are addressed 
and remedies are initiated, there is no doubt that progress 
can be made.  While there are a number of options to 
consider with regard to developmental strategies, the 
tourism industry presents definite opportunities for 
growth.  The benefits of a more robust tourism industry in 
Peru will be closely examined in a subsequent chapter, 
demonstrating how much Peru has to offer not only to the 
                     18 Joe-Marie Burt, 149. 
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world through its fascinating history and beautiful 
culture, but even more importantly how much it has to offer 
to its own people through the use of its numerous 
resources.  There is no doubt that progress can be made 
allowing Peru to achieve its potential for development.  
These resources are nothing new; they have always existed, 
simply never taken advantage of.   
17 
II. ECONOMIC STRATEGY, 1963-1990 
While Latin America is comprised of 20 independent 
countries, it is particularly interesting how each has 
undergone practically the same economic experiences.  Some 
countries have encountered more difficulties generating 
development and employment.  Adding to these already 
intricate difficulties, the entire region suffered from the 
temptation of foreign borrowing in the 1970’s, causing for 
the debt that each country had already accumulated, to 
increase to considerable levels and ultimately leading to 
what we know as the Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980’s.   
 Peru has struggled to overcome similar obstacles in 
route to development.  Its historical as well as current 
situation is comparable to several of its neighbors.  The 
cities of Peru are beautiful and modern, however a short 
distance outside of the suburbs, lay miles and miles of 
shantytowns in which a significant majority of the Peruvian 
population live.  Sights like these raise the question; how 
is it that the government could let such devastation 
persist, especially given that it is in fact the majority.  
What measures have been taken to alleviate this poverty-
stricken country from the wrath of fiscal crisis, 
unemployment, poverty, and all that comes along with the 
territory of underdevelopment?  Examining the 
administrations that have held the presidency beginning in 
1963 with Fernando Belaunde Terry provides a base for 
examining why the conditions necessary for development fail 
to exist and from which the argument defining tourism 
18 
promotion as the missing strategy, for both social and 
economic development, is derived.   
A. IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), has been 
a part of numerous attempts at stabilizing the Peruvian 
economy until the Fujimori administration put a stop to 
this unsuccessful strategy.  For this reason it is 
important to first understand what it entails prior to 
delving into the analysis of the administrations of Peru.   
The pursuit of Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) throughout the region was stimulated by external 
shocks suffered in world trade caused by the Great 
Depression and World War II.  While successful in some 
countries, specific characteristics of each influenced how 
far it proceeded and when it ran into crisis.  ISI had a 
delayed beginning and limited progress in Peru, however 
when it was implemented it came in the form of rash 
policies during the 60’s and 70’s and helps explain the 
deep crisis it suffered in the 80’s.19  The reactions of 
first world banks to this crisis were uniform; they ended 
voluntary lending to most Latin American countries, which 
as we have noted earlier had become increasingly dependent 
on these loans.  This in turn caused severe problems and 
instigated a domino type effect in regards to the economy.  
A huge financial drain that deepened fiscal crisis resulted 
from the drastic reductions in capital inflows and the 
strong pressures to maintain debt service.  “Chronic fiscal 
deficits in turn fueled inflation, which hindered 
investment and growth, disorganized the economy, and 
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unleashed distributional conflict.”20  Government plans at 
stabilization were unsuccessful and made things 
increasingly worse by interfering in the market.  
Hyperinflation was the ultimate effect in Peru with the 
combination of the deep fiscal crisis and the transition to 
unconsolidated democracy.21  Hyperinflation is a very 
serious consequence to suffer, especially by a country 
whose population is largely poor and unable to take 
advantage of the type of financial mechanisms that middle 
and upper class Peruvians use to mitigate the impact of 
this condition.  With this group of people bearing the most 
losses, support by the masses for bold stabilization 
measures increased.  
There is a perception that political leaders and 
economic elites can foresee eventual fiscal problems, which 
may lead to crisis.  This statement seems ironic being that 
if this were the case, it definitely overestimated the 
abilities of the first two governments to predict the 
outcome of their plans for economic development and 
stabilization, especially Belaunde.  “If a chief executive 
faces the problems immediately and tries to prevent great 
losses before they come, strong popular support may not be 
received”.22  Essentially, when the most pain is being felt 
and when it seems that things couldn’t possibly get worse 
economically, the more willing leaders and citizens are to 
incur risks and costs of systemic transformations.23  This 
is an understandable statement, however was not necessarily 
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the case in Peru as will be seen during in the following 
chapter during the regime of an outsider, Alberto Fujimori.   
 Returning to Import Substitution Industrialization 
measures pursued, there were inherent limitations posed by 
the limited size of markets and lack of competition that 
led inevitably to inefficiency.  Early signs of economic 
problems prompted increasing efforts to complete national 
industrialization sustained by the increase in availability 
of foreign bank lending in the 1970’s.  Foreign banks 
pushed loans on Latin American governments, which 
ultimately through misuse lead to serious economic 
problems.  Similar to an eighteen year old being issued a 
credit card for the first time, the easy access to  
international capital hindered the implementation of 
responsible adjustment plans. 
B. FERNANDO BELAUNDE TERRY, 1963-1968 
 While it may be hard to imagine, there was a period 
when development took precedence over any other type of 
investment.  This desire and focus of attention became 
characteristic of the early years of Fernando Belaunde 
Terry’s first term in office, 1963- 1968.  The phrase, “El 
Peru Construye” became a slogan associated with the 
government’s economic philosophy during those years.  The 
major manifestation of this attitude was a massive increase 
in public investment, massive increases in expenditure for 
construction, as well as large increases in social services 
particularly education and health.24  The ultimate aim of 
the administration was to give the public sector a more 
active role in investment and social improvement, all 
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objectives that following governments would promote in 
their election platforms without any success in 
implementation.  “Belaunde displayed a healthy skepticism 
toward economist, and his love of Peru and its people often 
led him to digress from a financial discussion into a 
monologue on some new physical achievement of his 
government”.25  By all means, these were accomplishments 
deserving of attention, however what became most noticeable 
was the lack of direction regarding how to finance the 
development effort.26  The Finance Ministry, the Development 
and Public Works Ministry, the Planning Office, as well as 
the Central Reserve Bank- all agencies principally 
responsible for economic policy- were not coherently 
combined nor was the talent available to really make each 
ministry of legitimate worth.   
 Equally important was the complacent views members of 
the government held regarding inflation.  It was seen as an 
“inevitable concomitant to development”; unfortunately it 
was also an inevitable concomitant to fiscal and financial 
problems, which would only come into full view in the years 
following 1965.27  Effective implementation of taxation was 
also an area that lacked structure during the Belaunde 
administration.  The desired end state would have been an 
active and progressive tax policy, which in turn would have 
sought to strengthen and increase direct taxation on 
incomes and property.  Instead,  
The initial tax measures of the government 
reduced taxation of enterprises by widening 
exemptions on profits taxes and import duties to 
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be paid by industry. At the same time, the level 
of import duties and of the turnover tax were 
raised.  The strategy was to provide a stimulus 
to private investment, which had been lagging, 
while at the same time to raise revenue through 
taxes that were easy to collect.  Initially, the 
measures led to a significant increase in 
revenue, but eventually the loopholes that had 
been opened became a major claim upon potential 
tax revenues.  Moreover, the tax system came to 
rely even more than before on regressive forms of 
taxation.28 
 Fortunately, the means in which taxes were implemented 
were not drastically felt initially with the ability of 
domestic revenues to keep up with government revenues.29  
However, between 1963-1967, government revenues began to 
plateau.  In the meantime, expenditures (teacher’s 
salaries, growth of subsidies, military expenditures, and 
investment expenditures) continued to increase consistently 
and maintaining balance between the two became impossible.   
This was not a positive sign for the remainder of 
Belaunde’s term in office, despite his initial intentions.  
The amount of funds available was grossly overestimated if 
taken into consideration at all.   
 Foreign loans and the use of domestic private savings 
became the primary means of dealing with the deficit.  
Neither of these methods proved to be effective enough to 
cover what was outstanding.  Domestic inflation also 
continued to grow as the demand for imports increased, 
reaching an all time high by 1966.  All signs were pointing 
to a future of serious economic and financial problems.  
Hopes were raised by the fortunate increase in demand for 
Peruvian exports at a time when international prices were 
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escalating.  Somehow “luck” reflected positively on the 
Belaunde government, seeming as though they had been able 
to cope with “a social situation more unbalanced than that 
of many other Latin American countries, and at the same 
time give new direction for the development of the 
country”.30 
 Devaluation of the Peruvian currency, the sol, in 1967 
became synonymous with the Belaunde period.  Such an event 
becomes magnified politically after long periods of 
exchange stability and definitely takes a toll on the 
reputation of the government during which the devaluation 
occurred.  “A modification of the exchange rate looks like 
a retreat for the government, and a personal defeat for the 
chief executive.”31  The demise of the exchange rate was 
rapid and drew much unwanted attention, especially from the 
military that would ultimately overthrow Belaunde from 
office.   
The 1967 devaluation of the Peruvian sol by over 
forty per cent was one of a number of factors, 
which contributed to the ouster of President 
Fernando Belaunde Terry by the Peruvian military 
in October 1968. The military, having been 
critical of the Belaunde devaluation, appeared to 
have been committed to maintain the value of the 
sol, which was established in September 1967.32 
C. GENERAL JUAN VELASCO ALVARADO, 1968-1975 
Of all the governments that have reigned over Peru, 
the period under Velasco is the most memorable for the 
lasting problems it left behind for successor 
administrations to try to resolve.  Velasco began his term 
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in 1968 with an “emphasis on national autonomy, elimination 
of social control by the traditional landowner-export 
families, greater participation by workers in ownership and 
control of industry, and greater capacity for organization 
and self-help by the poor”.33  The desire to create a 
situation more favorable for the rural population is 
similar to those desires held by Velasco’s predecessor. 
However, the outcome of his plan, predominately based upon 
land reform accompanied by high levels of protection for 
domestic industry and increased tax incentives for private 
industrial investment, did not take the path it had 
originally intended.34   
 Land reform was presented as a means to help rural 
workers by giving them ownership of the haciendas and 
commercially oriented plantations.  Rural workers however 
compose a majority of the population of Peru, evidently 
making this a more difficult strategy to implement than 
expected.  These difficulties became apparent when 
examining the large number of the rural poor left without 
any benefits of this new proposal that was supposedly aimed 
towards their development in society.  Controversy was also 
instigated in the industrial sector upon the formation of a 
state program, “Industrial Communities”.  This program, 
similar to that of the land reform, aimed at bringing up 
the workers’ share of ownership and thus giving them a 
voice in company management.  The question that comes to 
mind however is, how can people who have a very limited 
education, successfully undertake a managerial role?  
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In conjunction with land reform, the Velasco 
government took away previous restraints on organization by 
introducing regulations that made it practically impossible 
for firms to discharge anyone who had worked longer than a 
brief trial period and by initiating regulations requiring 
profit sharing- intended to build up worker ownership.35  
This measure taken to protect the jobs of workers took a 
turn that the government did not foresee. Quality of work 
produced was compromised and aggravated employers decided 
that being forbidden to fire any long-term workers gave 
them the incentive not to hire at all.. Chaos and 
deterioration of the economy was the end state of this 
transformation and the result of macroeconomic 
mismanagement.36 
 Along with the steady demise of the agrarian reform 
and chaotic redistribution of managerial responsibilities, 
inflation began to escalate quickly.  The Velasco 
government failed to respond appropriately, making choices 
to borrow abroad, keep interest rates down and foreign 
exchange cheap, impose domestic controls, and keep up the 
growth of spending.37  There was also a feeling of 
hesitation when it came to multinational investment.  These 
extreme measures of protection did more harm than good.  
First, it diminished contact with the outside world, which 
promoted healthy competition.  Secondly, it denied the 
potential for technological advancements without depending 
on foreign lending to acquire the imports necessary to 
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advance in that arena alone.  Finally and most evidently, 
it caused for the administration to turn a blind eye to its 
increasing dependence on external borrowing, and external 
debt steadily rose.38  Velasco’s ideas of shared ownership 
and the regulations, which gave permanent job tenure to 
workers, were rejected whole-heartedly soon after he lost 
power.  These reforms were discarded primarily as a result 
of the deterioration of the economy in combination with 
pressures from the IMF and most importantly the inability 
of the Velasco government to maintain a balance in his 
ideas of how a society should be managed and its 
willingness to take account of the preferences of the 
Peruvians people.39 
D. GENERAL FRANCISCO MORALES BERMUDEZ, 1975-1980 
 General Francisco Morales Bermudez replaced Velasco in 
office in 1975 and remained in office until 1980.  During 
this time his transitional military government was able to 
succeed moderately in resolving the issues of imbalance 
left behind by the former president.  Bermudez started a 
necessary process of correction with relatively mild 
remedies, including fiscal and monetary restraint, rapid 
devaluation, and reduction of real wages.40  All measures 
caused for the income of the rural population, particularly 
those who had already gained little from Velasco’s reforms, 
to decrease by nearly 13 to 15% during this five-year 
period alone.  The measures taken were far from ideal, the 
poor took the brunt of the effort to fix the overall 
balance and the plan of devaluation began to accelerate 
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making the rate of inflation grow increasingly worse.41  The 
unfortunate factor in all this was that because of the rash 
reforms, which were implemented in the previous regime, 
these measures were imperative despite the negative form 
they took.  Devaluation was of particular importance.  This 
was a mild shock the population had to deal with in order 
to get the economy back in order, however, as usual, when 
the appropriate time came to cut down on the rates of 
devaluation and exercise caution on monetary expansion to 
stagnate the rate of inflation, proper measures were not 
taken to do so.  Instead, the rate of growth of the money 
supply was allowed to rise, overshooting the rate of 
inflation.42  Consequently, inflation rose progressively  as 
a result of not taking the appropriate measures at the 
appropriate time. 
E BELAUNDE’S SECOND TERM, 1980-1985 
Belaunde made a comeback at a time when the Shining 
Path was going public for the first time and Peru’s 
informal section had grown to a level that surpassed any 
legal business sector. To add to these problems, he also 
was faced with other pressing problems, to include 
“establishing future relations with the armed forces, 
reigniting economic growth, dealing with the demands of a 
mobilized popular sector, and recognizing and devising a 
strategy to confront the Shining Path”.43  
In terms of economic policy, Belaunde had high hopes 
for restructuring the country’s dying economy and sought to 
cure unemployment through the creation of over 1 million 
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new jobs. Contrary to what he had originally intended for 
Peru, his plans took a completely different direction upon 
his appointment of Manuel Ulloa as prime minister. Formerly 
Belaunde’s Minister of Economy, Ulloa remained a firm 
believer of neo-liberalism and devised a policy 
prescription designed to, “enhance the market by reducing 
the economic preponderance of the state, removing tariff 
protection from industry, and encouraging private foreign 
investment”.44  For a short amount of time, the strategy had 
its glory with renewed confidence in the country by foreign 
investors and banks as demonstrated by the influx of loan 
opportunities and privatization.  By 1982 however, public 
support for Belaunde’s liberalization plan decreased with 
the realization that its promises of increased GDP and 
employment were not being delivered.  In addition to these 
delivery failures, inflation began to accelerate and loans 
were being held back as the signs of deterioration began to 
surface.   
With economic conditions worsening, the low-income 
groups in the highland regions were suffering the most.  
The administrations liberalization policies were causing 
further deterioration of living standards of a majority of 
Peruvians while feeding into the hands of a select 
privileged few. Belaunde and his team did recognize this 
negative turn of events, however his “efforts to address 
these disparities and the deepening distress of the poor 
were inadequate”.45  He continued to pursue measures that 
made cuts in social programs, further aggravating the 
population and subsequently causing for social unrest to 
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increase and feed into and strengthen the influence of the 
Shining Path.  
As seen in Belaunde’s previous term in office, while 
his plans for stabilization were well intended, they fail 
drastically upon implementation.  With inflation having 
increased considerably, the already existing gap between 
state and society continually widening, and a renewed 
accumulation of debt, Belaunde exited his political career 
with little to show but a great deal of economic turmoil 
for future administrations to handle.    
F. ALAN GARCIA, 1985-1990 
 The turn to heterodox experiments taken in the 1980’s 
by Alan Garcia were inspired by the failures of orthodox 
measures taken by the previous administrations.  Having 
faith in the promises of heterodox experts regarding the 
feasibility of cost free stabilization and theories of 
inertial inflation, Garcia “embraced the claim that renewed 
development would lower inflation by eliminating economic 
bottlenecks”.46  Plan Inti was developed, having the 
political advantage of promising to bring about economic 
stability in a distributionally neutral and politically 
cost free fashion.47  A temporary price freeze was 
recommended by heterodox experts, as was the plan to create 
a new currency and peg it to the dollar.  This plan aimed 
at breaking the inflationary mentality by linking the 
currency to a stable foreign currency.   
 The views of Garcia’s economic advisors emphasized the 
requirement for increases in production and investment in 
order to achieve stabilization and the need to implement 
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tax and interest rate cuts.48  They also sought to reduce 
the fiscal drain on the state by limiting external debt 
service by 10 percent of export revenues in order to leave 
the government with ample resources for stimulating 
domestic development.49   
 Initial heterodox measures proved to be successful, 
however were short lived.  With difficulties growing, 
Garcia took a bold move and sought to nationalize the 
private banking system.  This step was “designed to force 
higher investment and stem capital flight and thus 
counteract the increasing hesitancy of the private sector, 
which had come to regard the heterodox program as 
unsustainable and therefore refused to invest at the levels 
sought by the government”.50  There was strong opposition to 
this move and eventually Garcia had to put his plan in the 
backburner.  Distrust increased substantially among the 
business district and to make matters worse the economic 
crisis became even more severe than before.  As usual, the 
bold move that failed in the end hurt the poor sectors of 
the country, which means the majority of the population.   
 In light of the persistent deterioration of the 
economy, Garcia was forced to look at more orthodox 
measures in the hope of salvaging what he could of the 
economy and his reputation.  He adopted five rather 
orthodox stabilization packages, which still retained 
heterodox elements, such as price freeze.51  His efforts 
failed to lower inflation but succeeded in producing severe 
recession and deepening the poverty level, if that was at 
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all imaginable.  Failure plagued his stabilization plans 
once again and he switched back to more heterodox policies 
in hopes of bettering the situation as quickly as possible, 
which in turn would aid in redeeming himself in time for 
the 1989 elections.  Failure occurred again unsurprisingly 
and he ultimately attempted to adopt tougher orthodox 
stabilization measures.  His inability to come up with a 
decisive plan and even worse, settle on one method of 
stabilization developed a severe aversion to not only 
himself but also toward the professional political class 
that he essentially represented.   
G. CONCLUSION 
 While each of the governments examined in this chapter 
did have intentions of targeting the major issues of 
poverty and inequality though their economic strategies, no 
significant changes were accomplished except for the return 
to democracy in 1980 following nearly ten years of military 
rule.  There was however initial success in nearly all 
reforms implemented.  However, as was typical of the cycle 
of Peruvian strategy implementation, initial success in 
economic strategy ultimately deteriorates to failure due to 
the lack of focus on the major issues at hand: poverty and 
inequality.  Although these plans often raised expectations 
among Peruvians for a better quality of life, the economic 
development that resulted rarely generated a sufficient 
amount of employment necessary to significantly reduce 
poverty, particularly in the rural areas.  This contributed 
to violence across rural Peru and a constant cycle of 
political crisis at the national level.   
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III. FUJIMORI: GROWTH WITOUT EMPLOYMENT 
At the time of the 1990 presidential elections, 
conditions in Peru were at the brink of complete disaster.  
While the economic decline had been the result of years of 
crisis, the Garcia administration’s experiment with 
heterodox economic policy contributed significantly to the 
continuous erosion of the country both socially and 
economically.  Economically, less than 10 percent of the 
population was adequately employed, real wages had 
decreased drastically, the average household consumption 
fell 46%, income distribution became increasingly skewed, 
and GDP had fallen by 25 percent between the years 1988 and 
1990 alone.52 Socially, poverty levels increased sharply 
throughout the country, spending on public health and 
education fell 30%, and the country’s overall 
infrastructure fell into a state of severe disrepair as the 
leading guerilla insurgent group, Sendero Luminoso, 
continued to gain strength and make its way into Lima.   
After years of crisis and growing disillusionment with 
the political class, the Peruvian people were more than 
ready for change. Peru’s economy would take a drastic turn 
towards a truly draconian orthodox stabilization package, 
following the disastrous era of the Garcia administration. 
Initially presented by presidential candidate Mario Vargas 
Llosa, this program called for a harsh IMF-like 
stabilization program that would ultimately re-integrate 
the county into the international market after years of 
isolation during the Garcia administration.  Vargas Llosa’s 
“shock” program would include measures to: liberalize 
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trade, resume full debt payments, encourage foreign 
investment, privatize state enterprises, eliminate price 
controls and subsidies, overhaul the tax structure, and 
construct a free market economy that would replace the 
failed statism and mercantilism of the past.53  
Unwilling to accept the harsh terms of the program, 
the population responded negatively to this proposed 
solution to the country’s problems, subsequently taking 
their votes, which had originally supported Vargas Llosa in 
the first round of the presidential elections, and casting 
them in favor of Alberto Fujimori.  Fujimori campaigned 
strategically, promising a moderate and less painful 
solution to the economic disarray and targeting the needs 
of the rural inhabitants, which comprised a majority of the 
population and consequentially a majority of the votes.  He 
pledged to make governmental credit easily accessible to 
informals and campesinos and also to provide legal 
protection to street vendors, both big promises that 
benefited an ever-growing sector of society. His descent 
also became one of his greatest advantages as the struggles 
that had been overcome by the Japanese immigrants in Peru, 
classified him as other than the typical political class, 
justifying his motto of being “un presidente como tu”.  
Ultimately, while rival Mario Vargas Llosa had won the 
first electoral round by 3 points, Fujimori pulled ahead 
significantly in the second, defeating his opponent with 
62% of the vote.   
This chapter examines the policies implemented during 
this administration, the effect the policies had on the 
economy as well as the population, and ultimately what led 
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to the fall of what could have been the most promising 
regime to take the reigns of the country.    
A. THE EARLY YEARS 
Upon taking office on 28 July 1990, it became apparent 
to the newly elected president that he had inherited a 
disaster and the moderate strategy to economic recovery 
upon which he won the presidency would not work in these 
circumstances.  Ironically, by 1991, Fujimori implemented a 
much harsher stabilization program than that which had been 
designed by Vargas Llosa and subsequently rejected by a 
majority of the population.  The orthodox stabilization 
package consisted of a series of measures aimed at 
attacking runaway inflation and reconstructing the Peruvian 
economy through: state privatization, deregulation of 
financial and labor markets, tax and tariff reform, 
investment incentives, decentralization of some social 
services, and the reduction of social spending54.   
The design of the stabilization program that was 
implemented were harsher that what would have been desired 
by the population, as it mimicked what they had voted 
against, thus leading to “further pauperization of the 
population”.  Real income decreased by one-third, overall 
consumption declined 24 percent, the total population of 
Peruvians living in poverty increased to a high of 54 
percent, and finally the proportion of under or unemployed 
increased with levels of inequality rising accordingly.55  
These early consequences were expected however, and 
promises of a social emergency program were made to lessen 
the toll it would take on the poorest segments of the 
population.  Expenditures made on the social emergency 
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programs were nowhere near the $400 million originally 
allotted, but rather only $90 million was actually spent.  
Disregard for the poor changed gradually from 1993 on 
however, with an increase in social programs from 2 percent 
GDP for the first year of Fujimori’s government to 6 
percent by 1995.56  Support remained high for this seemingly 
radical president, despite the severity of the preliminary 
phase of shock treatment.  “Peruvians yearning for 
political authority and economic stability was so great 
that they would accept whatever actions the new president 
took to resolve crisis.”57 
Fujimori’s first year to eighteen months in office did 
achieve some relief for the country.  Repercussions of the 
harsh measures taken allowed for payment of foreign debt 
that had amounted to $21 billion by 1990.  Through the 
development of SUNAT (the National Tax Administration), 
which made strenuous effort to raise tax collections, and 
by holding down government spending, the government gave 
priority to resuming service on external debt.58  Immediate 
implementation of regular payments of $60 million to 
International Financial Institutions renewed confidence in 
Peru, finally pushing the country into the right direction 
and reintegrating it into the world economy.   
As confidence in Peru was renewed, public investment 
in the country rose accordingly. Originally held down 
through 1991, it increased to 25 percent by 1994, partly 
stimulated by aid from international development agencies 
as a result of the further downturn of the economy in early 
1992.  The investments made by multinational corporations 
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assisted considerably in the reconstruction of Peru’s 
public infrastructure, which had not only been battered by 
the violence of Sendero Luminoso but also suffered from the 
basic disregard for its maintenance.  
The long-term issue of runaway inflation also began to 
diminish.  The reduction of protection was intended to 
reduce inflation by “allowing buyers to switch to imports 
whenever domestic prices of particular goods rose above 
external levels and by increasing the flexibility of the 
production process through more open access to imported 
supplies”. 59  By 1992, only two years into his presidency, 
inflation dropped to 55 percent from a crushing 7650 
percent.   
High public opinion, concurrence from opposition party 
FREDEMO regarding this stabilization package and his neo-
liberal economic goals in conjunction with the policy 
making powers derived from the Constitution of 1979, 
concentrating power in the chief executive, fostered the 
increasing arrogance and authoritarian tendency that was 
beginning to surface towards the end of 1991.  Having 
little representation in Congress, a pact with the Peruvian 
armed forces was established and the military became 
Fujimori’s main institutional foundation of the new 
regime.60  With this, Fujimori chose as principal advisor of 
military affairs, Vladimiro Montesions, who was already 
stained with a discharge from the army for allegedly 
passing information to the United States and specializing 
in defending drug traffickers.  Existing tensions between 
the executive and Congress intensified upon Fujimori’s 
apparent abuse of decree powers as he took the liberty to 
                     59 Sheahan, “Searching for a Better Society”, 158. 
60 Klarén, 409. 
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exploit the graces given by the presidential honeymoon 
period.  By November, 120 decrees had been issued, aiming 
at liberalizing the economy and reconstructing the state.  
On April 5th of the following year, Fujimori took one 
drastic step further, carrying out an autogolpe (self-
coup).  This entailed the suspension of the Peruvian 
Constitution, the closure of Congress, and the eventual 
dismemberment of the Judiciary.   Fujimori announced the 
creation of a “Government of Emergency and National 
Reconstruction” that would prepare the way for “true 
democracy”.61  While the end goal was supposedly democracy, 
this did not fare well with the international community.  
Economic aid and support was withdrawn almost immediately, 
jeopardizing Fujimori’s entire economic recovery plan of 
reintegrating Peru into the world economy.  Due to 
international pressure, elections for a constituent 
assembly to rewrite the constitution were held in May, with 
municipal elections to be held later that year.  Regardless 
of having to give into these pressures, Fujimori managed to 
tailor it all to meet his ultimate desires.  
B. AUTOGOLPE OF 1992  
 The autogolpe implemented in 1992 implanted the virus 
of corruption that plagued the Fujimori administration and 
led to its eventual demise.  As previously mentioned, the 
international community was not in agreement with this new 
plan and ultimately the Organization of American States 
(OAS) forced the Peruvian government to restore “democratic 
institutionality” via the application of a newly 
constructed constitution to be followed by municipal 
                     61 Klarén, 413. 
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elections.62  Soon after, the Democratic Constituent 
Congress (CCD) was formed, of which 44 of the 80 seats went 
to Fujimori’s Cambio 90 affiliates, with the purpose of 
drafting this new constitution.   
In October of 1993, the new Constitution was proposed, 
highlighting one notable change, which permitted the 
reelection of the president to a second consecutive term, 
thus opening the door for Fujimori in the upcoming 1995 
elections.  In addition to this change, it tightened laws 
on terrorism, consolidated institutional power at the top, 
and created a more centralized state, all modifications 
which gave the chief Executive ultimate power. With an 
already weak system of checks and balances, the autogolpe 
evidently further eradicated any remaining obstacles, 
namely the legislature and the judiciary, which may have 
prevented Fujimori from remaining in power for a second 
consecutive term.  Ultimately, this was his main objective 
as we see the transition of holding office become a selfish 
economic benefit than an overall political one.  This same 
transition was visible not only in the role of the 
president, but also in all parties that took part in the 
politics of the Fujimori government.   
Upon the ratification of the new Constitution, the 
tables turned in regards to which sectors of society 
supported the government and the changes that were being 
implemented.  Support for the President, among lower income 
groups decreased due to the government’s failure to 
generate growth or real income, despite the drastic 
reduction in hyperinflation.63  In order to regain the 
                     62 Catherine M. Conaghan, The Immoral Economy of Fujimorismo in The 
Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru 
(Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2006), 109. 
63 Klarén, 418. 
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backbone of his support, social spending aimed at 
alleviating the distress imposed upon the urban and rural 
people, as a result of the “Fujishock”, needed to be 
increased in a hurry.  Acknowledging where his efforts 
needed to focus, Fujimori developed a program to sell off 
state owned enterprises.  This program initially received 
negative responses from the private sector, especially when 
considering the odds that foreign firms would want to 
invest in a country characterized by a “terror-infested, 
low exchange rate, high interest rate, and volatile” 
history that Peru had suffered.64  Contrary to popular 
belief however, this program in conjunction with the newly 
reformed tax program- that streamlined the two main tax 
institutions (SUNAT and SUNAD), slashed the numbers of 
taxes, and raised both individual and property taxes- lead 
to the dramatic rise in much needed revenue.  Central Bank 
reserves climbed from a deficit of $143 million to over $6 
billion by the end of 1994.65  With these accomplishments in 
his pocket, Fujimori sought to expand his control to 
eventually micromanage all of the government’s social 
programs and in due course assume monopoly over public 
works as well.  Attaining these goals was a given in his 
case, having gained a significant amount of public support 
through his ability to deliver the above mentioned demands, 
crush runaway inflation and for the most part, defeat 
Sendero Luminoso through the capture of leader Abimael 




                     64 Klarén, 418. 
65 Ibid, 420. 
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C. BEHIND THE SCENES 
 The ability to deliver promises, or at least more 
promises than previous administrations had even attempted 
to deliver, masked the insurmountable corruption that 
circulated behind the scenes of the Fujimori 
administration.  Corruption was the primary constitutive 
feature of the regime, the “cartilage and collagen that 
held it together and ensured its reproduction”.66   
 Greed rings were rampant, and while the overall intent 
by all involved was to maintain Fujimori in power, even 
beyond the second term that he had attained through 
reconstruction of the Constitution, individual rings 
generated for personal benefit.  Fujimori’s security 
advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, arranged illicit deals with 
numerous high-ranking public officials, brokers, and top 
commanders in the Peruvian Armed Forces.  These 
transactions ranged from deals with narcotraffickers to 
deals with legislative officials to abandon their political 
organizations and side with Fujimori.  The later became the 
primary means of securing an unheard of third term for the 
President.    
 On top of Montesinos’ dealings and those of civilian 
policy makers to include officials from the Ministry of the 
Economy, Fujimori himself had developed a greed ring of his 
own that involved the transfer of gross amounts of money to 
Japan. With his sister and brother-in-law serving as Peru’s 
ambassadors to Japan, these transactions flowed in and out 
of the country with little speculation.  The above-
mentioned family members also managed the creation of two 
non-profit foundations, Apenkai and Aken, which aimed at 
raising money in Japan for philanthropic projects in Peru.                       66 Conaghan, 103. 
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“An estimated $42 million flowed through a complicated maze 
of domestic and foreign banks set up by the president’s 
relatives to manage the foundations’ finances”.67  This 
estimate, supposedly coming directly from personal 
accounts, raises tremendous speculation as it surpasses the 
modest salary of the president.  Questions regarding 
Fujimori’s excess spending and ability to produce unusual 
amounts of money at a moments notice were brought to rest 
when the presidents’ former wife, Susana Higuchi, reported 
that she had found a sum of $110,000 in a safe in the 
private quarters of the palace.68  Considering the supposed 
modest pay of the Peruvian president, this amount is well 
over the personal budget of the president.   
 With evidence of corruption continually surfacing, 
support for Fujimori dwindled.  With the 2000 elections 
approaching, this was a less than favorable situation to be 
in if the administration was to succeed in maintaining 
office and continuing with their lavish lives, financed by 
corruption.  When April 9th (preliminary elections) arrived, 
Fujimori lost the absolute majority.  This loss spurred an 
even greater corruption scandal masterminded by Montesinos, 
Operation Recruitment came into play.  Monthly pay offs of 
$15-20,000 were made to Congress members who fell into the 
trap of Montesinos, contingent that they either desert 
their political organizations and side with Fujimori or 
agree to act as spies, informing Montesinos of activities 
of the opposition in Congress.69  This, as all of the 
illicit transactions made, became a very costly means of 
campaigning from which public sources were robbed.  The 
                     67 Conaghan, 108. 
68 Ibid, 108. 
69 Ibid, 111. 
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Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, the Armed Forces 
and SIN (Peru’s National Intelligence Service) funds were 
the primary donors, although unknowingly.    
D. CONCLUSION 
 For the first time in decades, Peru had managed to 
creep out of its hole of economic crisis and head in the 
right direction for development, at least initially.  The 
Fujimori administration delivered promises of social 
development, an escape from runaway inflation, debt 
payments, and the reintegration into the world economy.  It 
seemed too good to be true, and in the end it was.  The 
truth is, that the developments that had managed to 
actualize during this administration are a taste of what 
“could be”.  
 Besides pointing out the degree of corruption that 
took place during Fujimori’s terms in office, the 
examination of this particular administration offers 
constructive insight to what measures have proven to be of 
value in the developmental process. The administrations 
recognition of the importance of foreign investment is 
particularly notable, especially when considering how 
important of a role investment plays in the development of 
a strong tourism industry.  Just as Fujimori used the 
revenue brought in through the investment of multinational 
firms to rebuild a worn down public infrastructure, the 
same methodology can implemented today to continue with the 
strengthening of the state infrastructure and to sharpen 
the once grim image of Peru.  The beautification and 
modernization efforts will draw in further investment, 
primarily in the service industry; hotels, resorts, 
restaurants, etc.    
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 Additionally, taking into account the amount that had 
been embezzled in the corruption that kept Fujimori and his 
cronies in power, it is evident that the opportunity for 
development was riper than ever.  While efforts were made 
to target the problems that had caused Peru to land in the 
situation it had been in for years, namely poverty and 
inequality, it is a fair to say that the wealth that filled 
the pockets of the Fujimorista’s failed miserably to 
trickle down.  Some schools were developed, roads built, 
and health care centers constructed, however it is crucial 
to highlight that while significant developments they are, 
it is not enough to bring the country and its population of 
from the depths of despair.  The number of these projects 
could have been double what they were and the quality of 
service provided could have been more than just adequate.  
Roads could have been built, public works could have been 
further developed to provide basic resources to those who 
needed, and continue to need them most.  
An unfathomable amount of money was essentially wasted 
during the Fujimori administration.  While the question of 
“what could have been” will always remain when reflecting 
on this particular administration, the Fujimori experience 
should serve as a lesson learned, demonstrating the vast 
possibilities that exist for development and hopefully 
leading individuals in office to direct investments into 
more tangible projects that could generate significant 
employment, such as tourism.    
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IV. TOURISM EXAMINED 
The underlying cause of Peru’s problems is the 
poverty, inequality in social services and employment 
issues that plague each region of the country.  Chapters II 
and III demonstrate that while these problems have not gone 
unnoticed by numerous administrations, they have 
essentially remained unchanged despite various efforts to 
lessen their devastating impacts.  Each president since 
Belaunde’s first term in 1963 has sought to increase public 
investment, expenditures for construction, as well as large 
increases in social services primarily in education and 
health.70  Unfortunately, while the initial motives were 
good, the implementation of these policies fell severely 
short of achieving the desired outcome.  Other economic 
crises, which were a direct implication of the issues noted 
above, became more of a priority and took over political 
and economic decisions.  Corruption, as seen predominately 
during Fujimori’s regime, also deprived the country from 
countless possibilities of development.  Taking into 
account the billions of dollars embezzled by the 
administration, so much more could have been accomplished 
in terms of the country’s infrastructural development.   
On the flip side of the similarities shared by the 
various administrations, we also see many differences when 
comparing the economic policies of Belaunde, Velasco, 
Garcia and ultimately Fujimori.  Peru has had an eclectic 
history when it comes to policy implementation, adopting 
strategy’s ranging from an extreme reform in the 
                     70 Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress: 
An Account of the Belaunde Administration, 1963-1968 (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), 51. 
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distribution of land to the most draconian style 
stabilization program.  Given the abundance of natural 
beauty and culture that Peru has been blessed with, nowhere 
has the value of tourism been taken into significant 
consideration and incorporated into economic strategy.  
Given that income inequality and lack of employment are 
fundamental shortcomings of Peru’s current development 
strategy, the aggressive development of the tourist 
industry may provide a remedy by creating a labor intensive 
service industry in a sector in which Peru has a 
comparative advantage. 
  Presently, the current president, Alejandro Toledo, 
in conjunction with his officials in the Ministrio de 
Comercio Exterior y Turismo (MINCETUR) has developed an 
actual plan of action, the Plan Estrategico Nacional de 
Turismo (PENTUR), in an effort to bolster the tourism 
sector of Peru.  While this is a step in the right 
direction, the plan identifies its primary objectives yet 
remains vague in defining concretely how these objectives 
will be accomplished.  This chapter’s focus is to examine 
how Peru can benefit from a more robust tourism sector by 
first identifying the benefits and detriments of the 
industry, analyzing the regional inequalities in the 
tourism sector, and finally by examining what efforts have 
been made towards the improvement and promotion of this 
overlooked asset. 
 
A. BENEFITS OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY 
Peru has enormous potential for tourism development 
with the vast number of attractions that that can 
accommodate all interests, ranging from culture to urban 
tourism.  With this, it is important to note the value of 
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the industry and the linkages it has with sustainable 
development.  These are economic, social and environmental 
linkages, which have further ties that affect and are 
affected by other sectors such as transport, health, and 
cultural heritage sectors.71  Figure 1, excerpted from a 
recent study supported by the World Bank, presents the 
impacts (positive and negative) that the various sectors 
within the identified linkages have as a result of tourism.   
 There are three major areas where incoming tourism 
makes a positive addition to a country’s economy:  
1. Contributions to GDP 
2. Encouragement of inward investment 
3. Increase in opportunity for employment72 
Through an increase in foreign exchange earnings from 
hotels, restaurants and other tourism related groups, it is 
evident that a robust tourism industry can contribute to 
the country’s overall GDP.  While Peru possesses the means 
for increasing GDP, the lack of current available domestic 
capital, as a result of years of poor economic policy 
implementation, makes the development of a stable tourism 
infrastructure increasingly difficult.  Foreign investment 
however, is an important instrument through which 
development can occur.  Chapter III analyses the Fujimori 
regime, and in doing so calls attention to the 
possibilities presented to the country by way of foreign 
                     71 Taylor, Pedroso and Anil Markandya, “Tourism and Sustainable 
Development: Lessons from Recent World Bank Experience,” in Proceedings 
of Tourism and Sustainable Economic Development Macro and Micro 
Economic Issues jointly organized by CRENoS (Università di Cagliari e 
Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, and supported 
by the World Bank (Chia Laguna Hotel, Sardinia, Italy, 19-20 September 
2003), 2. 
72 Les Lumsdon and Jonathan Swift, Tourism in Latin America (New 
York: Continuum, 2001), 31. 
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investment.  In regard to this particular sector of the 
economy, the potential for development is excellent.  
Studies have shown that in light of other development 
issues, Peru, similar to a majority of Latin American 
countries, has suffered from a funding gap in the tourism 
sector and governments have been reluctant to invest in 
substantial tourism projects.73  Consequently, because the 
government overlooks the benefits of investment beyond the 
privatization of Peruvian corporations the tourism sector 
has been relatively starved of the investment necessary to 
stimulate growth that would be of equal benefit to numerous 
sectors of society.   




Figure 1 Linkage between World Bank Projects and 
Sustainable Development 
 
On the social level, investments made into the hotel 
and restaurant sectors of the industry cater to the needs 
and demands of tourists, which in turn prove to be 
favorable to a much broader majority of the population vice 
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benefiting the slim number of individuals comprising the 
political and industrial elite.  For example, electricity, 
water, sewage, etc. are all common and basic services that 
most tourists, especially those traveling from developed 
countries, enjoy in their homeland.  Services such as these 
however have unfortunately been denied to a large majority 
of the Sierra and Selva regions of Peru.  With this 
deficiency, the only means of attracting travelers and 
sustaining their business is to provide these services.  By 
default, the population normally deprived of water, 
electricity, sewage and such would benefit from these 
improvements, proving that the advantages of tourism extend 
beyond the economic and reach far into the social 
development of the otherwise severely underprivileged rural 
majority. 
 Socially and economically, the tourism industry opens 
the doors for employment. These opportunities provided in 
the services sector cannot go unnoticed, especially 
considering the wide range of underemployment and 
unemployment that persists throughout Peru.  While there 
are arguments that rebut the impressive opportunities 
presented for employment through this sector, and will be 
examined below, the catalyst to job openings is that this 
industry, contrary to the traditional manufacturing 
industry, is exceptionally labor intensive.  The average 
number of employees per hotel room, for example, is 
estimated at two, depending on the type of hotel and the 
local skill base.74  Notably, hotel type jobs are considered 
to be good as they have good working conditions, 
comparatively speaking, and relatively good pay.75  While 
                     74 Taylor, Pedroso and Markandya, 6. 
75 Ibid., 6. 
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the level of education of most of the rural population is 
limited, the skill level required to fulfill a janitorial 
staff for example is not terribly demanding.  For positions 
requiring greater proficiency skills, there is a 
government-sponsored institution, El Centro de Formacion en 
Turismo (CENFOTUR), which provides training in specialized 
areas. Programs include but are not limited to bartending, 
culinary education, business management, sales, cultural 
entertainment and customer service in travel agencies and 
airlines.  Currently, CENFOTUR is located in Barranco, a 
section within Lima; however with the appropriate 
allocation of funding it would be more than possible and 
advantageous to develop extension schools into other cities 
outside of the capital.  By doing this, an increased level 
of education becomes available to the population, which in 
turn broadens employment openings and opportunities.  Also 
worthy of mention is the role women play in this sector, 
with the percentage of females working in this sector 
higher than that in other economic sectors.76  
 Scholars pessimistic towards the development of this 
industry find most contention in the impacts tourism could 
have on the environment.  There are definite possibilities 
that an influx of tourism in one location could be erosive 
to the environment, however the efforts put into preserving 
the environment often go unnoticed.  La Reserva Nacional de 
Paracas (National Reserve of Paracas) for example, is one 
project that demonstrates these efforts.  Created in 1975, 
the National Reserve of Paracas is one of Peru’s most 
protected areas of the country.  Its primary objectives 
including: 
                     76 Taylor, Pedroso and Markandya, 9. 
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• The conservation of the marine life ecosystem 
with concentration on fish, birds, and marine 
mammals 
• To grant special protection to endangered species 
• The preservation of Peru’s cultural and 
historical heritage 
• To develop techniques of rational use of some 
“hidrobiologicas” species 
• To develop facilities for recreational, 
educational and cultural use 
• To contribute to the economic development of the 
region77 
The Nasca lines are also found in this same site, making 
Paracas an attraction rich location.  Accommodations 
however are severely lacking, with only one hotel with 
continuous running water.  With the appropriate funding to 
enhance the exterior image of the region, tourism here 
could flourish, providing substantial revenue for the 
population, for the upkeep of the reserve and protection of 
the environment. 
 In addition to The National Reserve of Paracas, the 
World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility has supported 
and funded projects linked to tourism that aim at 
protecting the country’s environment. The Participatory 
Management of Protected Areas Project-Peru specifically 
seeks to:  
(a) Ensure biodiversity conservation by 
strengthening the capacity and involvement of the 
communities and the private sector to sustainably 
manage the protected areas and (b) to obtain 
sustainability for the financing of recurrent 
costs.  A subcomponent of participatory protected 
                     77 El Mundo Azul, a nongovernmental organization that provides 
information regarding the preservation of the environment. Website 
supported by Peru.com 
http://www.peru.com/mundoazul/la_costa/paracas.asp 
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area management is the development of sustainable 
economic activities, one of which is wildlife 
management for tourism development and use of 
tourism services (e.g., research, educational 
awareness).78 
Evidently, the environmental effects of tourism have not 
gone unnoticed, but have rather been focused on as a means 
of drawing in revenue for the preservation of its regions 
and wildlife.  Again, with the appropriate funding directed 
towards the enhancement of the tourism industry these 
efforts can be enhanced significantly, causing development 
to be inevitable.    
B. NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY 
Despite the benefits noted above, there are impacts 
that may take a negative turn. Some literature suggests 
that tourism does little to bridge the gap between 
developed and developing countries, stating: 
There is no clear link between tourism growth and 
economic development, owing to many other 
complicating factors such as inflation, the 
ability of an area to diversify and the 
willingness of the local population to work 
hard.79 
While this statement seems far-fetched, it does hold some 
truth; if the industry is not closely monitored and policy 
is not tailored to thwart the problems that may arise, 
countering the economic and social benefits that have been 
previously addressed.  Surprisingly, while one of tourism’s 
greatest contributions is to the country’s economy it is 
also one of the industry’s most debated issues along with 
                     78 Taylor, Pedroso and Markandya, 19. 
79 Holloway, J.C. The Business of Tourism (London: Pitman Publishing, 
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the impacts the sector may have on the socio-cultural 
environment and the natural environment.   
 With the value of tourism lying predominately on 
economic factors and emphasizing the positive contribution 
of tourism to the economy,80 the negative impacts can 
occasionally go unnoticed.  The creation of local or 
regional imbalances within the economy, exacerbating the 
already existing inequality of income distribution between 
rural and urban zones, leads the list of counter 
arguments.81  The subject of inflation also arises when 
examining tourism, and while it is difficult to make a 
direct correlation between the industry and inflation, it 
has been done.  This argument asserts that: 
The nature of International Tourism implies an 
increasingly greater degree of world wide 
economic integration.  In addition to the 
increased wage levels and pressures on real 
estate in cities, tourism can be said to have 
contributed to inflation and a negative balance-
of-payments level through the importation of 
(expensive) foreign goods.82 
 Foreign investment as well as the overall concept of 
foreign travelers visiting and imposing their demands on 
the population has become an additional target of 
negativity in conjunction with the above mentioned economic 
impacts.  Foreign investment presents a double-edged sword.  
While this sort of investment is exceedingly important for 
developing countries, multinational corporations introduce 
their technologically advanced versions of the already 
existing smaller industries such as airlines, travel 
agencies, hotels, restaurants, etc.  Being that most                      80 Lumsdon and Swift, 191.  
81 Ibid., 191. 
82 Ibid.,192. 
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developing countries, and Peru in particular, have 
continuously sought to gain stature in the technological 
field, this should be seen in a positive light.  Contrarily 
however, scholars have come to view this more as a threat 
to resident industries thus overwhelming local interests.83  
 On a socio-cultural level, the threat comes in the 
form of personal interaction.  Essentially it opens the 
eyes of the population, particularly the rural population, 
to the possibilities of development. Necessities that 
visitors demand will be expected to be delivered, despite 
the fact that the country being visited often times does 
not have the means to provide particular services as they 
may not be part of or considered to be part of their 
“cultural standards”.  In the end, it has been stated that: 
When mass tourism from highly industrialized 
societies is introduced into an economically 
underdeveloped country, the contrast between the 
two societies is apt to be stark and the 
consequences often great … The difference between 
the consumer habits of the tourists and the 
living conditions of the indigenous population is 
thus accentuated and the differences between the 
two societies emphasized.84 
Along the same socio-cultural lines, traditions such 
as arts and crafts and ceremonies observed by the 
population become threatened by commercialization. By 
contrast, yet equally negative, some communities may be 
forced to stray from modernization for the sake of 
maintaining the interest of travelers.  Tourists often 
expect to see Indigenous communities unaffected by time and                      83 Lumsdon and Swift, 193. 
84 Ibid., 195.  Quote in Lumsdon and Swifts Tourism in Latin America, 
referencing Lothar Nettekoven’s ‘Mechanisms of Intercultural 
Interaction’ in Tourism: Passport to Development? Perspectives on the 
Social and Cultural Effects of Tourism on Developing Countries by 
Emanuel de Kadt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) 
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living in an extreme version of “traditional village life”.  
While it is important to maintain a cultural identity, the 
“issue is to what extent the ‘traditional’ Indian community 
remains a developmental time warp in order to seek economic 
gain by whetting the appetites of the tourist markets”.85  
In addition, the effects tourism may have on the 
environment take a central role in countering the benefits 
of the industry.  The list that has been derived linking 
tourism to environmental damage is extensive, including: 
1. Congestion 
2. Increased pollution loads in both water and air 
3. Use of resources, particularly fresh water and 
energy resources 
4. Solid waste generation 
5. Degradation of cultural heritage 
6. Ecological Impacts 
7. Impacts of induced settlement 
 
To emphasize the above-mentioned points, the case of Machu 
Picchu has been expounded upon as it is the predominant 
cultural site visited in Peru.  However, it is important to 
note that this location has suffered damage primarily due 
to poor management and while the argument is valid and 
attempts to point out the negative side of tourism, it 
actually plays into the hands of just the opposite 
position.  Promoting the numerous other cultural, nature 
based, and urban tourism sites that exist in Peru would 
alleviate Machu Picchu and a selective handful of other 
locations that have been promoted by the government of such 
issues as congestion, waste generation, and increased 




                      85 Lumsdon and Swift, 199. 
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C. REGIONAL INEQUALITIES: PROMOTION AND TOURISM INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION 
To date, the negative effects of tourism have often 
outweighed the positive effects in Peru due to the regional 
inequalities that are discussed in this section.  “With a 
rich cultural and archeological heritage, scenic 
landscapes, varied climates, diverse natural ecosystems and 
beaches, the quality of Peru’s tourism attractions are 
outstanding”.86  Despite the vast diversity of attractions, 
Machu Picchu is Peru’s primary site that has become the 
defining attraction of the country’s tourism industry in 
conjunction with Lima, the capital city.  With high levels 
of concentration in these two areas, the negative impacts 
of the industry are effortlessly proven.  However, as 
previously mentioned, a more evenly distributed tourism 
sector would significantly benefit the country in the 
development process all the while easing those negative 
effects that could disintegrate the value of specific 
regions of the country.  
 Analyses show that the tourism sector brings 
tremendous benefits to the region in terms of GDP and 
employment creation, particularly through the revenue 
brought in through the hotel and restaurant sectors.87  More 
detailed analyses however, further demonstrate the 
inequalities that exist within the industry.  Inequalities 
rest primarily in that the revenue brought in from the 
industry promotes the development of the already better-off 
departments versus the poorer ones.88   
                     86 Greg O’Hare and Hazel Barrett, Regional Inequalities in the 
Peruvian Tourist Industry in The Geographic Journal, Vol. 165, No. 1. 
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 In an effort to analyze the regional inequalities in 
the tourist industry, it is important to first look at how 
the country is divided.  Peru consists of three physical 
regions which are broken up as follows89: 
 
1. Western Departments (10):  
a. 46% of the population 
b. 10 Departments 
c. Generates 80.5% of the country’s GDP 
d. Consists of Lima-Callao metropolis included 
in this region which forms the economic 
heartland of the country with 54% of the 
nation’s GNP 
 
2. The Sierra (Highland Region): 
a. 50% of the population 
b. 9 Departments 
c. Mostly Indigenous Amerindians 
d. Poorest part of the country with only 12.5% 
of the country’s GNP 
 
3. The Selva: 
a. 4% of the population 
b. 5 Departments of the Amazonas 
c. Generates 7% of the nation’s annual wealth 
from the sale of timber and petroleum. 
 
A study completed in 1997 by Mendoza Quintana, 
examined these divisions and the consequent regional 
inequalities of the industry through the calculation of 
each region’s Tourism Attractiveness Index (TAI).  Five 
resource categories are employed in the evaluation of the 
TAI, to include: 
1.  Natural Sites 
2. Cultural, historical and archaeological heritage 
3.  Folklore 
4.  Technical, scientific and artistic works 
5.  Tourist programs and events 
 
                     89 Information regarding the regions division exerted partially from 
the Background section of O’Hare and Barrett’s article, Regional 
Inequalities in the Peruvian Tourist Industry, 48. 
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Without going into great detail as to how calculations 
are obtained, the method used by Quinta has proven to be a 
useful tool in providing an overall impression of the 
distribution of the country’s tourism resources.90  The 
final evaluation of the study demonstrates just how uneven 
the tourism industry in Peru truly is, revealing that many 
resource rich areas do not receive the tourism that would 
be expected given the resources available in accordance 
with the calculated Tourism Attractiveness Index (TAI), 
making them resource rich/tourist poor departments.91  A 
prime example of such a department is that of Ancash, which 
has an TAI of 73.74 (Table in Figure 2, col. 9) and drawing 
a number of tourists- represented in col. 1 of the Table in 
Figure 2 through the mean annual number of bed nights 
stayed by foreign travelers- comparable to other 
departments which have a significantly lower TAI index 
(Tacna).  While the figure representing the number of bed 
nights stayed is by no means meager, the gaping disparity 
between bed nights in respect to specific departmental TAI 
is astounding.  Figure 3 further exemplifies this point of 
widening disparity, graphically demonstrating the 
“departmental distribution of the mean annual (1985-96) 
number of foreign tourist bed nights in relation to the 
Departmental Tourist Attractiveness Index of Mendoza 
Quintana’s 1997 study”.92 
After examining the TAI’s provided through Quintana’s 
study, it is notable that very few departments in Peru have 
a Tourism Attractiveness Index below ten.  These numbers 
                     90 A detailed description of how the Tourism Attractiveness Index 
(TAI) is calculated can be found in O’Hare and Barrett’s article, 
Regional Inequalities in the Peruvian Tourist Industry, 53. 
91 Ibid., 54. 
92 Ibid., 52. 
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beg the question, why are only a select few departments, 
primarily the Cuzco and Lima/Callao departments, the most 
widely traveled by foreign tourists? It is important to be 
aware of the distinction between the type of tourists, 
domestic and foreign, when answering this question as it 
demonstrates the promotional weakness of the tourist 
industry.   
 The tourism industry has suffered primarily at the 
hands of the government, chiefly in their failure to 
provide a stable infrastructure that would support an 
industry that accentuates the country’s attributes.  
Without the appropriate transport systems, adequate 
lodging, and a vigorous promotion strategy such an industry 
will not survive at the levels necessary to advance 
developmentally. In regards to transportation, Peru’s 
outlying regions are inadequately served in comparison to 
the more developed cities: roads outside stretching into 
the Selva or more remote regions of the Sierra are few and 
far between; the railway system is small; services are 
generally poor and journeys slow, subject to  constant 
stoppages and derailment; and air transport facilities 
outside of Lima, which is a necessity for most tourists 
where distances are great, roads are poor and terrain 
difficult, are of poor quality and not equipped for night 
flights thus leading to congestion of flight times.93  Such 
deficiencies hamper the potential of the county in 
promoting its numerous attractions and enhancing the 
industry as a whole.  More over, without a means of 
reaching a particular destination there is hardly any point 
in promoting it.  
                     93 O’Hare and Barrett, 54. 
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Tourist services are also an area in which the 
industry is severely lacking.  This shortcoming seems 
unexplainable considering that El Centro de Formacion de 
Turismo (CENFOTUR) was developed in 1940 in an effort to 
“improve the quality, efficiency and productivity of Peru’s 
tourism workers and prepare them to assume management and 
supervisory positions in the hospitality industry”.94  In 
1995 alone, enrolment was at 1,791 students, 30 percent 
higher than it had been the previous year.95  With such a 
large number of people having received training to hold 
positions in the industry, the quality of service should be 
exquisite and ample.  It is the poor distribution of 
quality hotels and restaurants throughout the country that 
stagnates employment possibilities and restrains the 
industry from flourishing, not necessarily the lack of 
individuals possessing the skill base necessary for 
employment.  A recent study examining the regional pattern 
of tourist services points out that Lima alone holds 46.3% 
of the country’s total tourist accommodations with 31% of 
the hotels and 30% of the restaurants.96  Cuzco on the other 
had, despite the average 287 thousand foreign tourists that 
come to explore the vast Inca Empire, only possesses 7.3% 
of the total accommodations.97  Looking beyond basic 
accommodations, quality hotels and restaurants (Four and 
Five Stars) are highly concentrated in the capital.  O’Hare 
and Barrett note that in 1996, “there were thirty 
                     94 Matt A. Casado, “Peru’s Tourism Industry: Growth, Setback, 
Threats,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 
(February 1, 1998), 6. 
95 Ibid., 6. 
96 O’Hare and Barrett, 56. 
97 Numerical figures are taken from the Table in Figure 2, exerted 
from O’Hare and Barrett’s article, Regional Inequalities in the 
Peruvian Tourist Industry. 
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registered Four Star and ten Five Star hotels in all of 
Peru, where of the Five Star hotels eight were located in 
Lima with one each in Trujillo and Cuzco”.98  At this rate, 
even if tourists do desire to visit other regions of the 
country, there is little chance of doing so.  Tourism will 
be increasingly difficult to promote if upon arrival, after 
a treacherous journey on unkept roads, finding decent room 
and board proves to be just as difficult, with lodging 
outside of Lima and Cusco being practically obsolete.   
 The availability of quality hotel accommodations and 
restaurants is a direct reflection of the amount of 
investment made into specific departments of Peru.  With 
vigorous promotion it is inevitable that investment will 
closely follow and vice versa, as they go hand in hand.  
Consequentially, the correlation between tourist flows and 
the wealth of regions can be made. This point can be 
clearly seen through the apparent disparity in the levels 
of investment in and promotion of coastal cities when 
compared to the rather forsaken Sierra and Selva 
Departments. Studies have shown that the “higher income, 
lower poverty coastal Departments” bring in a rather steady 
inflow of visitors as the infrastructure to support their 
presence has been made available through the appropriate 
funding.  In contrast, (with the exception of Cuzco, Madre 
de Dios and Loreto) the Sierra and Selva Departments do not 
share, on a comparative level, this same kind of success.  
Proving that “in general most tourists do not visit the 
poorest regions of the country primarily because the poorer 
regions in Peru lack tourist resources and/or facilities.  
A large number of Peru’s poorest Departments are then 
                     98 O’Hare and Barrett, 56. 
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subsequently unable to take advantage of any potential 










Figure 2 Number of foreign and domestic bednights ratios; 
per capita income, percentage living in poverty, and TAI by 
Department100                      100 Figures 2 and 3 based off of study by Mendoza Quintana, exerted 




Figure 3 Departmental distribution of the annual (1985-96) 
bednights in relation to TAI index 
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D. CONCLUSION: EFFORTS TO BOLSTER TOURISM- EVOLUTION OF 
TOURISM IN PERU 
Endorsement of the tourism sector is primarily the 
responsibility of the Peruvian government, and it is 
evident through the vast regional inequalities described 
above, that the administrations that ruled during the 
periods covered in this essay, failed to develop the 
tourist industry to its fullest potential. Attempts to 
bolster tourism however began to surface during the 
Fujimori government, and despite the regimes corruption-
based downfall, efforts have continued to develop through 
the current administration of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006).   
Foreign investment and the Fujimori administration 
became synonymous of each other.  Contrary to those regimes 
that preceded him, Fujimori embraced investment whole-
heartedly and found it to be the remedy to a majority of 
Peru’s problems.  In addition, the government sought to 
privatize nationalized industries and did so with “two 
dozen state-run hotels.  With the revenue brought in, 
millions of dollars were spent to improve roads and 
airports.  Tourism projects during this administration 
totaled more than $300 million, focusing primarily on hotel 
construction.”101  The outlook for the industry was 
encouraging and enrollment in the country’s tourism-
development institution (CENFOTUR) skyrocketed, broadening 
the skill base available for employment in the now foreign 
owned hotels. The economy changed for the better and 
confidence in Peru began to strengthen accordingly.  The 
capture of Abimael Guzman in September 1992, leader of the 
Maoist Insurgent group, Sendero Luminoso, added 
significantly to this newly restored confidence.  As a 
                     101 Casado, 6. 
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result, there was an “upward trend in the number of inbound 
tourists which reached 600,000 in 1996, despite U.S. State 
Department warnings to its citizens about the dangers of 
travel in Peru”.102   
It goes without saying that security is a major 
concern for all travelers, and while there remain spurts of 
civil protest in the country, the violence once experienced 
has been under wraps for nearly a decade. Outside of Peru, 
security issues have put a damper on the tourism industry, 
and understandably so.  Figure 4103 demonstrates the gradual 
rise and evolution of tourist inflow between the years 1998 
and 2003. The industry plateaus in 2001, representative of 
the September 11th attacks in New York and Washington D.C. 
In 2003 however, we see the sector take up again upon the 
implementation of tighter security measures. 
 
 
                     102 Casado, 6. 
103 Figure excerpted from PENTUR, PERU: Plan Estratégico de Turismo 
2005-20015, Bases Estratégicas developed by MINCETUR Peru, 2005. 
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Figure 4 Numbers of Tourists to Peru 1998-2003 
 
With the demise of the Fujimori regime, Alejandro 
Toledo took the reigns as president in July of 2001.  While 
his predecessor’s administration was tainted with 
corruption, many of his initial decisions proved to be 
beneficial to the country and remained in tact.  Foreign 
investment maintained a high level of importance and served 
to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and services.  
“During the last five years, Peru averaged an economic 
growth rate of 5 percent or more. Revenue from exports has 
nearly tripled. Five years ago, 24 percent of Peru's 
population lived in extreme poverty; today, it's 18 
percent. And the unemployment rate is down from 10.5 
percent before Toledo took office to 9.1 percent today.”104   
These accomplishments achieved by the Toledo 
administration reflect constructively on the possibilities 
                     104 Ruben Navarrette Jr., “Peru’s Toledo Put Country on Right Path” 
SignOnSanDiego.com (April 23, 2006) 
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of the development of a more robust tourism industry.  To 
date, a plan has been developed with the goal of promoting 
the tourism industry and developing it into a primary 
source of revenue for the country.  El Plan Estrategico 
Nacional de Turismo (PENTUR) has set forth goals for the 
tourism sector for the years 2005-20015, however as 
previously mentioned, the overall plan is relatively vague.  
It identifies strong goals and objectives for the country 
in terms of tourism development; however an exact process 
as to how these goals will be achieved is not clearly 
identified.   
 In the mean time, improved economic and social 
conditions have helped rebuild Peru’s image, which had 
previously been severely tainted by violence and 
corruption.  “The importance of image as an influencer of 
consumer attitude must be taken into consideration by those 
hoping to promote destinations.”105  While promotion by 
tourism organizations, such as MITINCI and Promperu for 
example, facilitate the advertisement of the industry the 
task of promotion cannot be accomplished by them alone. 
Image plays a tremendous role in promotion and improvements 
in this arena come in the form of infrastructural 
developments.  Ultimately, the fate of these developments 
rest in the hands of policy makers. Implementation of 
policy focused on the development of a strong 
infrastructure will cater to the needs of the population 
and will in turn cater to the need of foreign travelers, 
thus drawing increased numbers of visitors who seek to 
broaden their cultural perspectives.  




















Perhaps the most notable characteristic of the time 
period covered in this thesis, 1963 to present day, is the 
lack of change brought to the country via the economic 
policies implemented.  While change is a vague term to use, 
it encompasses all the areas within the Peruvian 
infrastructure that are most in need of improvement.  As 
was discussed in Chapter I, the country has stood still in 
terms of advancement as a majority of the problems 
identified continue to repeat themselves.  Setbacks 
include, inconsistency of policy, macroeconomic imbalance, 
economic deficit resulting from excessive external 
borrowing, an escalating informal sector, and escalating 
violence.  These are most identifiable as they have been 
the basis of most policies derived by the government.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that these are all 
consequences of the underlying and most obvious issues; 
inequality, poverty, and most importantly 
under/unemployment.  This thesis has proposed the 
development of tourism as an important mechanism to address 
these key problems.  Tourism is a relatively labor-
intensive industry that could provide stable employment in 
the rural areas of Peru where past development strategies 
had little or even a negative impact on the quality of life 
of their inhabitants. 
Chapter II examined how various regimes sought to 
tackle poverty and unemployment, demonstrating that while 
none of the governments were ignorant of the matters at 
hand, none were able to implement a plan capable of 
producing outcomes stable enough to last for longer than a 
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couple of years.  It was not until 1980 that any realistic 
decision making occurred, reopening the doors to foreign 
investment, which at the time seemed would be the saving 
grace for the country.  After a number of years without a 
significant inflow of foreign investment, other than that 
provided by government borrowing, the country was 
regressing, both in terms of economic and infrastructure 
development. Unfortunately, the damage had already been 
done at the hands of previous regimes and the disillusion 
in the ruling class led a significant number of Peruvians 
to join the ranks of the Shining Path.  Feeding off of 
years of failure by the Peruvian government to deliver its 
promises of increased employment, development of schools to 
better educate the population so as to alleviate the first 
issue, and improved living conditions, the Maoist group 
increased in strength and through their actions, caused for 
any improvements in the economic condition of the country 
to be negated.  As conditions worsened throughout the first 
half of the 1980’s, the second half was doomed for further 
failure as the incoming government sought to use the 
country as an experiment for heterodox policies and other 
radical ideas such as the nationalization of Peruvian 
banks.  The economy fell to its knees and the lives of the 
population fell along with it.  Unemployment levels soared 
and the numbers of families living in poverty increased as 
a consequence of the former.  Inflation, a common problem 
faced by most governments, escalated to levels that could 
only be managed through a very strict neo-liberal policy 
that would be implemented by the Fujimori administration in 
1990. 
 Fujimori’s government is unique, putting an end to 
both ISI and democracy as it eventually transformed itself 
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into an authoritarian regime.  Despite the consequential 
downfall of the administration, as a result of the 
corruption scandals that kept Fujimori in power nearly 
three consecutive terms, there is a great deal to learn 
from this government, both the good and the bad.  Most 
important, is the need to legitimately focus on the issues 
that are most detrimental to the society and tailor 
decisions and policy around them in an effort to find a 
solution.  Fujimori’s regime demonstrates that hope is not 
lost for the country in regards to development and bringing 
itself out of an economic slump.  Through foreign 
investment, tax reforms and privatization, revenue flowed 
into the country at levels comparable to the 1950’s, when 
the Peruvian economy was at its most stable.   
 There are tremendous opportunities for Peru in regards 
to development that combine both growth and employment, and 
a number of avenues are available to achieve it.  Tourism 
is one of the most promising because Peru has a comparative 
advantage in providing this service if the attention and 
funding are appropriately allocated.  With an enhanced 
tourism sector comes a wide array of benefits that serves 
both the state and its people; enhanced GDP, employment 
opportunities, opportunities for increased levels of 
education, infrastructural developments, and environmental 
protection.   
 Naturally, with the positive there are always negative 
aspects that could take shape as a result of the tourist 
industry; congestion, pollution, commercialization of the 
culture, etc.  However, it is within the purview of the 
Peruvian state to take adequate steps to mitigate the 
negative effects.   
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As demonstrated in Chapter IV, in the section 
regarding the regional inequalities of the tourism sector, 
it is obvious that a majority of the counter arguments 
against tourism derive from the problems that have been 
seen in Machu Picchu.  Keeping in mind that this site is 
the predominant tourist location in Peru, along with Lima, 
it draws in a much larger number of tourists than any other 
region or department in the country, and as a consequence 
is more apt to experience the negativities that tourism can 
bring.  Interestingly, there are a large number of other 
departments that share in the folklore that attracts 
visitors to Machu Picchu and can in fact be appealing to a 
broader set of interests besides cultural tourism.  The 
problem is that the funding has not been allocated to build 
up and promote these regions.  As we have seen, obtaining 
the funds to do so is not an issue, provided that money 
brought into the country through investment, privatization, 
exports, loans, etc are in fact targeted towards tourism 
development off of the well-beaten path to Machu Picchu.   
 It goes without saying that Peru has enormous 
potential for development, and the development of a more 
robust tourism sector, while it is a different avenue than 
most administrations have previously taken, is a strategy 
that can benefit a majority.  Through the efforts made to 
build an adequate infrastructure to support tourists, the 
population benefits.  Through the investments brought in by 
the hotel and restaurant sectors, employment is created, 
educational opportunity enhanced, and poverty reduced.  A 
wider array of promoted attractions disperses the tourist 
flow more evenly, alleviating the problems of congestion, 
excess waste, pollution, cultural devaluation, etc.  The 
negative aspects of tourism will always remain a 
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possibility, however identifying them and increasing 
awareness of their effects will, if properly monitored and 
managed, eliminate their potential of occurrence and allow 
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